U.S. President Donald Trump was supposed to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in April in what was to be a closely watched engagement between the world’s two largest economies. Instead, the Israeli and American campaign in Iran forced a postponement, injecting fresh uncertainty into an already unpredictable relationship between the two superpowers.

Now rescheduled for mid-May, the meeting will take place under dramatically changed circumstances, fundamentally reshaped by the White House’s Iran gambit and its ripple effects across global markets, security dynamics and alliances.

Pundits will be debating whether Trump will travel to Beijing in a stronger or weaker position. Some will argue that Trump has created an advantage in his dealings with Xi by disrupting Iranian oil supplies to China, demonstrating a willingness to follow through on his threat to use U.S. military force and behaving undeterred by domestic political pressures. Others will claim that he has fractured his base, depleted military resources and disrupted security priorities, all while undermining America’s relationship with its allies.

So which is it?

Beijing might feel it is in a position it does not like to be in — reaction mode. But in the long run, it retains a more stable footing to outmaneuver Washington over time.

Reaction mode

The global strategic shock that is the Iran war has disrupted the trajectory of geopolitics and undermined the assumptions upon which governments based their strategies.

As an authoritarian government that administers a country with more than a billion people, the Chinese Communist Party-led China is particularly vulnerable to these shocks. The Xi government prefers stability to carry out its designed policies and keep its economy stable enough to ward off dissent and project a sense of national strength at home and abroad. The fundamental premises for those policies are now under threat, with the Iran war disrupting global markets, energy resources and security architectures.

Chinese state media outlets like Xinhua and the Global Times have already acknowledged the strain on oil markets and logistics, both of which are central to China’s export-led economy. More than half of China’s oil supply is imported from the Middle East, and the disruptions to oil flows, as well as the sharp increase in crude oil prices has second- and third-order consequences for Chinese shipping and manufacturing. Further, impacts to maritime transit and insurance prices for vessels have notable consequences for China’s international trade designs.

A worker in Dongguan, Guangdong province, operates a forklift moving bags of plastic pellets at a warehouse. Rising oil prices are driving up production costs for plastic manufacturers in China. | REUTERS

The Xi administration is thus forced to react, which means it must now mobilize its machinery of government to compensate for rapid changes in the strategic environment.

Among these changes is a White House that is operating in ways increasingly untethered from its original political moorings. What was championed as an “America First” administration that promised no new foreign wars has become a vehicle for unabashed regime change efforts abroad. When facing criticism even from its “Make America Great Again” base, the Trump White House has only doubled down, showing a government that operates more on the president’s whims than on established strategy.

It resembles the “madman theory,” first associated with the administration of Richard Nixon, in which unpredictability is used to induce caution in adversaries. But the madman theory can also invite miscalculation. If China thinks that it must only outmaneuver Trump rather than the U.S. intelligence and security apparatus, then it could potentially take action that increases the risk of incidents or other precipitating events leading to an economic or security crisis.

Beijing must choose whether it will center its approach to the United States on Trump, on broader U.S. government policies, or on a balance between the two.

Exposing vulnerabilities

Some will look at the war in Iran and argue that it is a clear demonstration of American military might. There is no denying the U.S. military’s tactical successes, as it has heavily degraded Iran’s air defenses, air and naval capabilities, and military industrial base.

But Iran is not a nuclear-armed, near-peer competitor. Iran’s GDP in 2025 ranked 44th in the world, and it relies more on asymmetric capabilities than conventional systems to project its power. What the United States has demonstrated against Iran is what it already showed in Iraq and Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks: The U.S. military is incredibly capable against weaker forces and proficient in executing deliberate operations where it has a strategic advantage.

While the U.S. showed its military primacy, Operation Epic Fury also revealed its vulnerabilities. The United States has expended so many offensive munitions and defensive interceptors that its military forces in the Middle East have had to borrow from other regions. Although not disclosing the specific number of missiles used, U.S. Central Command said last week that its forces have struck more than 13,000 targets since the start of the war, which indicates the minimum volume of munitions expended. Meanwhile, without adequate low-cost interceptors in place, they have used conventional defense systems like THAAD and Patriots to counter Iranian drone and missile strikes, running through these multimillion-dollar systems at a rapid pace.

As evidenced by a damaged building in Tehran, the U.S. has demonstrated its superior military in the Iran war. However, the operation has also exposed weaknesses. | REUTERS

There are now major gaps in replenishment that will cost billions of dollars and potentially years to reconstitute. This has contributed to a $200 billion emergency funding request from the Pentagon. To put that in context, that’s nearly four times the annual defense budget for Japan — and the Trump administration has just requested a record $1.5 trillion in defense spending for the next fiscal year.

What Beijing now sees is a United States that will be in a period of replenishment, and one that is not even guaranteed given the budgetary requirements and political conditions in Washington.

There are two risks here. The first is Chinese control over certain rare earth minerals needed for replenishment. While the United States has tried to reduce supply chain dependencies, the Xi government still retains potential leverage as the U.S. seeks to reconstitute after the Iran war.

The second risk is that hardliners in Beijing could feel emboldened. They may misinterpret this as a rare period of vulnerability for the United States that can be exploited.

Exploiting cracks in alliances

Beijing undoubtedly recognizes how the U.S.-Israel-Iran war has strained Washington’s alliance relationships. At the core is a familiar dilemma in alliance politics: the tension between fears of abandonment and fears of entrapment.

The Trump White House portrays some partners as being unreliable or slow to align with U.S. objectives, reinforcing long-standing accusations within the administration that allies freeride on American power while constraining its freedom of action.

Yet from the vantage point of America’s allies, the Iran war is evidence that Washington is willing to entangle them in conflicts driven by the preferences of a narrow set of actors.

Israeli soldiers walk by a billboard commissioned by an evangelical group in Tel Aviv. | REUTERS

Israel’s influence over the Trump administration’s approach to Iran has been particularly notable. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s direct influence in Washington emphasized what he framed as a once-a-generation opportunity for regime change in Tehran.

In explaining the decision to attack Iran, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated that U.S. action was compelled by the expectation of imminent Israeli strikes and the likelihood of Iranian retaliation. Rubio’s explanation underscored the degree to which the White House’s decision-making was shaped by Israel’s agenda.

Meanwhile, other U.S. partners — particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific — have received the opposite treatment: limited consultation and being left to deal with the consequences.

For partners in the Gulf region, this has included military attacks against their territories, but more broadly, it has meant the economic impacts from the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz. Although there was clear understanding that an attack against Iran would precipitate the closure of this critical maritime thoroughfare, the White House proceeded without consultation and subsequently demanded allied support in reopening the strait.

For these governments, the concern is not abandonment but entrapment, meaning that U.S. actions will draw them into a widening conflict or impose economic and security costs without their consent.

Such dynamics are music to Beijing’s ears. It sends a message that the U.S. alliance network is growing increasingly dysfunctional, which Xi may want to exploit. By widening the gaps between the White House and its partners, Beijing could complicate U.S. efforts to coordinate responses not only in the Middle East, but in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez (left) met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing last week. | SPANISH GOVERNMENT HANDOUT / VIA REUTERS

The Chinese government has already sought to position itself as a more stable partner in trade agreements with Canada following Trump’s tariff wars last year, and it is pursuing a similar approach now. On Tuesday, Beijing hosted Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez in a meeting in which Xi appealed that like-minded countries should “oppose the world’s retrogression to the law of the jungle.” This approach is likely to underpin China’s other diplomatic engagements with U.S. allies going forward.

Lessons for Xi

Through it all, the biggest takeaway for Beijing is that it has finally been able to see how the Trump administration would manage a real war. Since Trump’s first term, the commander in chief has bandied about the use of force, and the Iran war has shown the world how he would behave as a wartime president.

It has been a study in tactical success on the battlefield and strategic blunder. While the Trump team insists that it has achieved all its military objectives, the shifting goalposts, disruption to America’s own economic and diplomatic interests and assault on the rules-based international order have illustrated the clear difference between winning battles and winning wars.

For all the rhetoric about Trump’s acumen as a wartime leader, the evidence points to a different lesson for Beijing. The Xi government has been able to watch and learn that Trump’s businessman approach to war is detached from grand strategy, focused on whatever can be characterized as near-term military “wins” rather than tangible, long-term success across the full spectrum of national interests.

On the other hand, the Iranians have demonstrated how to outmaneuver and frustrate America. Despite being clearly outmatched militarily, Iran has accomplished this through asymmetric operations and the leveraging of diplomatic, information and economic measures in ways that can ensure regime survival, and induce the White House to end its military campaign.

People in Tehran walk past a billboard depicting Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in U.S.-Israeli airstrikes. Despite being outmatched, Iran has leveraged diplomatic, information and economic measures to surprising success. | ARASH KHAMOOSHI/ THE NEW YORK TIMES

With a month to go before the Trump-Xi meeting, there are still many ways that the Iran war can shape the summit and the trajectory for bilateral relations.

The fate of the Strait of Hormuz is significant, since Tehran is looking at using a toll system to extract reparations. Although there have been conflicting reports, Iran is expected to demand payment for maritime transit in currency other than the U.S. dollar — either cryptocurrency or the Chinese yuan. Beijing has been trying to shift the global economy away from the U.S. dollar to a Chinese-backed currency, and this would be a notable step toward that end. The White House has announced that it will attempt to stop this from happening, but this situation remains unresolved.

Whether a ceasefire holds is also critical. Every munition expended in the Middle East is one fewer that is available for the Indo-Pacific region and one additional line item for an already debt-ridden U.S. federal budget.

All the while, the effectiveness of U.S. alliance management will influence whether the White House is able to close fissures opened during this war, or leaves them vulnerable to Chinese exploitation.

Ultimately, the short-term advantage may lie with Washington in disrupting Beijing’s policy foundations, but structural advantage tilts toward China. In the U.S.- China great power competition, the White House must determine how to translate disruption into durable policy, understanding that time, stability and leverage are now on China’s side.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is a Japan Times contributor and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. He is also special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.

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